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Abstract  
 
Patient organisations contribute to many areas of pharmaceutical policy. In developing their 
organisational capacity, many turn to financial support from pharmaceutical companies, 
which may create conflicts of interests. However, the transparency of the industry’s self-
regulatory approach to the disclosure of payments to patient organisations has evaded 
scrutiny. Using company reports disclosing payments to UK patient organisations in 2012-
2016, we evaluate the transparency of reporting using indicators derived from industry’s 
European patient organisation Code. We found a large proportion of companies did not have 
any disclosure reports available despite many having made payments, confirmed by 
comparing with annual financial accounts of patient organisations registered as charities. 
Where disclosure reports were available, many payments were not adequately described, 
resulting in large portions of money being disclosed without clarity as to the payment type 
and purpose. We found companies were clearer regarding whether payments were financial 
or benefits-in-kind, but transparency was particularly inadequate as to whether it could be 
determined if payments were indirect or direct and restricted or unrestricted, and almost no 
companies mentioned the VAT status of payments. Our findings suggest that the industry’s 
self-regulatory approach to transparency has not been working efficiently. We suggest ways 
for standardising and increasing the precision of information by pharmaceutical companies 
and advocate for the introduction of a centralised, and easily accessible national-level 
payment database. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Patient organisations’ input is regularly sought by public authorities that license, appraise and 
price drugs in many EU countries for their unique insights on how patients view the risks and 
benefits of particular medicines (Culyer, 2005; EMA, 2018; NICE, 2018a). Furthermore, 
patient organisations increasingly contribute towards key aspects of pharmaceutical research 
including study designs and safety monitoring (European Patients Forum, 2013; Wehling et 
al., 2014). Given their growing policy and research involvement, patient organisations 
encounter many challenges in developing their capacity and expertise (Baggott and Foster, 
2008; Löfgren et al., 2011). 
 
These challenges may be addressed by partnering with pharmaceutical companies to secure 
funding and other support. Industry organisations and organisations closely aligned with 
industry have argued that patient organisation-industry financial relationships facilitate the 
development and optimal administration of drugs (EFPIA, 2017; Haerry et al., 2018) and 
boost patient organisations’ expertise (Parsons et al., 2015). However, others have cautioned 
that financial relationships often represent a conflict of interest (COI, Lo and Field, 2009) 
undermining the legitimacy of patient organisations in many jurisdictions, including the UK 
(Davis and Abraham, 2013), Australia (Fabbri et al., 2019; Löfgren, 2004), Finland 
(Hemminki et al., 2010), US (Kopp et al., 2018) and Canada (Lexchin, 2019). This COI may 
involve patient organisations promoting particular drugs (Colombo et al., 2012), some with 
unclear therapeutic benefits (Grey and Bolland, 2015), or may encourage self-censoring to 
maintain relationships with collaborating companies (Batt, 2014).  
 
One response to these controversies has been via enhancing the transparency of financial 
relationships between the two sides. This is part of a global policy trend in which 
transparency, primarily understood as public disclosures, is applied to individuals’ and 
organisations’ ties to pharmaceutical companies (Fabbri et al., 2018; Grundy et al., 2018). 
Regulators in drug appraisals and approvals ordinarily ask their patient organisation 
consultees to disclose any COIs associated with funding sources (EMA, 2018; NICE, 2018b). 
Separately, patient organisations may disclose industry links online, although some fall short 
with this aspiration (Colombo et al., 2012; O’Donovon, 2007). Perhaps the most 
comprehensive disclosure initiative has been introduced by the European Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA), representing pharmaceutical companies 
operating in Europe, via its Patient Organisation Code of Practice (henceforth ‘the EFPIA 
Code’, EFPIA, 2011). Implemented through industry self-regulation, this initiative requires 
companies to disclose support to patient organisations in Europe from 2012 onwards. The 
transparency of these pharmaceutical industry disclosures has not yet been assessed.  
 
We examine the assumption that disclosure equals transparency (EFPIA, 2017), where 
disclosure is the reporting of payments and transparency is the clarity of the reporting. 
Viewing transparency as a multidimensional construct (Schnackenberg and Tomlinson, 
2014), we consider the disclosure of information (i.e. reporting of payments), its accuracy 
(i.e. reporting the correct recipients, not concealing payments) as well as its clarity (i.e. 
providing informative descriptions of the disclosed payments). These are pertinent 
considerations since the alleged efficacy of industry self-regulation for ensuring transparency 
often becomes an argument against the introduction of legally binding disclosure laws 
(EFPIA, 2017), despite consistent findings of the shortcomings associated with self-
regulatory approaches (House of Commons Select Committee, 2005; Zetterqvis et al., 2015). 
Specifically, we evaluate the extent of pharmaceutical company compliance with the EFPIA 
  
Code using nine indicators constructed based on the Code and payment disclosures published 
by 108 companies covering payments in the UK made between 2012 and 2016.  
2. Policy background - Industry self-regulation of payment 
disclosures to patient organisations 
 
Applicable to company payments to patient organisations, the EFPIA Code (2011) stipulates 
that companies must “make publicly available a list of patient organisations to which it 
provides financial support and/or significant indirect/non-financial support” accompanied by 
a description which is “sufficiently complete to enable the average reader to form an 
understanding of the significance of the support”. The monetary value or non-monetary 
benefit of the payment must be stated, and the information must be “provided on a national or 
European level and should be updated at least once a year”. 
 
The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) Code of Practice (2012), 
incorporates the principles of EFPIA’s Code, and because of the similarities between the 
relevant sections of the Codes, we subsume the ABPI Code under the higher-level EFPIA 
Code. Two specific features of the ABPI Code are firstly that companies may also provide 
their payment as a percentage of the recipient’s income, and secondly it excludes payments to 
patient organisations from Disclosure UK (Ozieranski et al., 2019a; Pearcy, 2019), a publicly 
available database of payments made to healthcare professionals (Mulinari and Ozieranski, 
2018) and organisations (Ozieranski et al., 2019b). Instead, payments to patient organisations 
are disclosed on each company’s website.  
3. Materials and Methods 
 
The data examined in this study is part of a large database of pharmaceutical industry 
payments to patient organisations (Ozieranski et al., 2019a), with the variables examining the 
transparency of financial disclosures developed specifically for this study. We considered 
108 companies abiding by the ABPI Code (53 were members of the ABPI and 55 were not, 
as of 2018), of which 66 published a disclosure report for payments made in at least one year 
between 2012-2016. We analysed 220 disclosure reports, covering 5232 payments made 
between 2012-2016, and extracted them into a single database, including recipient name, 
payment value, any payment description, and whether the payment as a percentage of the 
recipient’s income is provided. We adjusted the values to their 2016 sterling equivalent. Two 
researchers coded payment descriptions, with differences resolved by agreement. 
 
For 444 (87%) out of 508 identified patient organisations registered with any of the UK’s 
charity regulators (the Charity Commission for England and Wales, the Office of the Scottish 
Charity Regulator, the Charity Commission for Northern Ireland), we collected additional 
data from their financial accounts including financial year end, whether drug companies were 
mentioned and, if so, what companies.  
3.1. Constructing the indicators of transparency 
 
  
We deduced three general indicators of transparency from the EFPIA Code (see Web 
Appendix 1 for their elaboration). These apply to transparency under disclosure (indicator 
1.1), accuracy (1.2 and 2.1-2.3), and clarity (3.1-3.4). 
 
1. Do companies disclose payments to patient organisations? 
 
1.1. Availability of disclosure reports 
The EFPIA Code requires companies to “make publicly available a list of patient 
organisations to which it provides financial support and/or significant indirect/non-financial 
support” and to update this information annually, therefore at least one disclosure report per 
company should be available if payments have been made. Importantly, companies are not 
required to keep reports on their websites for a specific number of years and earlier reports 
may simply have been removed. 
1.2. Undisclosed payments 
 
As an absence of disclosures may indicate a lack of payments rather than a failure to disclose, 
the Charity Regulator data was used to support or challenge this assumption by checking if 
companies were mentioned as supporters in charity accounts covering 2012-2016.  
 
2. Are the appropriate payment recipients being reported? 
 
We excluded payments when they did not meet certain criterion, which we termed 
inappropriate recipients, for reasons outlined below under three specific indicators (2.1-2.3). 
 
2.1. Recipients adhering to EFPIA’s definition of patient organisation 
 
Companies are required by the EFPIA Code to “make publicly available a list of patient 
organisations” rather than various organisation types, an important matter for ensuring the 
clarity and coherence of information, and a key precondition of determining the total funding 
received by patient organisations (another EFPIA requirement). We used the number of 
disclosed payments that did not adhere to EFPIA’s definition of patient organisations 
(EFPIA, 2011) as a transparency indicator as many of these payments should be disclosed in 
Disclosure UK (ABPI, 2017). Notably, two companies (Flynn Pharma and Santen UK) stated 
on their websites that their payments to patient organisations were in Disclosure UK for 
2016, and three companies stated this for 2015 (Alliance, Flynn Pharma and Santen UK). 
These companies’ payments were extracted from Disclosure UK; however, most were 
excluded from analysis due to not being to patient organisations. 
  
2.2. Single organisations reported as recipients 
 
If a single payment was reported with more than one recipient this was excluded if the 
amount received by each recipient was unclear.  
 
2.3. Organisations based in the UK reported as recipients 
 
Disclosure requirements reflect a national system administered by the ABPI, and therefore 
non-UK organisations should be reported separately. We identified locations through 
supplementary searches of organisations’ websites. 
  
 
3. Clarity of payment descriptions 
 
The EFPIA Code requires companies to provide payment descriptions so the “average 
reader” can “understand” the nature of the support. The following three sub-headings outline 
our approach to coding the quality of the 4572 payment descriptions remaining following 
exclusions identified in indicators 2.1-2.3.  
 
3.1. Number of words used in payment descriptions  
 
We assumed that more words typically equates to more clarity and detail. 
 
3.2. Clarity of payment form and goal 
 
We used payment descriptions to establish whether payment forms and goals were stated 
clearly. We defined payment form as the broad mode of the payment in terms of the capacity 
in which it was provided; payment goal was the intended use of the payment.   
 
3.3. Clarity of payment descriptions using 5 sub-indictors 
 
Using payment descriptions, we identified 5 sub-indicators of transparency which measure 
more specific payment details. As with indicator 3.2., these sub-indicators were deduced 
from the general requirements set out in the EFPIA Code (examples in Appendix 2). Namely, 
we determined whether each description provided enough information to identify if the 
payment is: 
 
a) Core or specific  
b) Financial or benefit in kind 
c) Direct or indirect 
d) Restricted or unrestricted  
e) Inclusive or exclusive of VAT  
 
Iterative readings of the payment descriptions with supplementary key word searches were 
conducted to code transparency indicators.  
 
3.4. Payment as a percentage of the recipient’s total income 
 
Appearing only in the ABPI Code (2012), companies can, but are not obliged to, provide an 
“indication” of their support as a “percentage of the patient organisation’s total income”. This 
information indicates how the payment compares to the recipient’s income.  
3.2. Analysis 
 
We conducted all descriptive analyses in Excel, with the exception of a Mann-Whitney U 
Test, which was conducted in SPSS to test the relationship between the number of words in a 
payment description and the clarity of the payment form and goal.  
  
4. Results 
 
We present our findings by reporting on the specific indicators under each transparency 
indicator category – (1) disclosure availability, (2) frequency of inappropriate recipients, (3) 
clarity of payment descriptions – and an assessment of the most/least transparent years. 
 
4.1. How many disclosure reports were available? 
 
Overall, 42 (38.9%) companies did not disclose payments to patient organisations on their 
website, whilst 12 companies (11.1%) disclosed payments for one year, 8 (7.4%) for two 
years, 13 (12.0%) for three years, 12 (11.1%) for four years, and 21 (19.4%) for all five 
years. Disclosure availability for payments made in 2016 was 42.6% of companies, but 
companies most frequently had a disclosure report available for 2015 (50%). Report 
availability was lowest for 2012 (27.8%), increasing slightly for 2013 (39.8%) and 2014 
(43.5%) (see Appendix 3 for further details). Of the companies with at least one disclosure 
report available, 43 (65.2%) were ABPI members (as of 2018) and 23 (34.8%) were not. 
Conversely, of the companies with no disclosure reports available, 11 (26.2%) were ABPI 
members and 31 (73.8%) were not.  
 
[Table 1] 
 
The annual accounts of 444 (87.0%) patient organisations registered as charities revealed 23 
(54.8%) companies with no disclosures available were mentioned on at least one charity 
account covering 2012-2016, with Genzyme being named most frequently (37 accounts), 
followed by Sigma Tau Rare Disease (8 accounts) and PTC Therapeutics (6 accounts) (Table 
1). The figures for Genzyme exclude accounts covering 2016 as Sanofi disclosed its 
subsidiary Genzyme’s payments for that year (but not 2012-2015). Companies with no 
disclosure reports were mentioned in 10 charities’ accounts in 2012, 11 in 2013, 14 in 2014, 
13 in 2015 and 17 in 2016 (figures exclude Genzyme). Of the companies mentioned in 
charity accounts, 5 (21.7%) were ABPI members and 18 (78.3%) were not, whilst for 
companies not mentioned in charity accounts, 6 (31.6%) were ABPI members and 13 
(68.4%) were not.  
 
4.2. What other recipients were disclosed as patient organisations? 
 
In total 656 (12.5%) of all disclosed payments had an inappropriate recipient. Eighteen 
companies dominated the picture with 20% or more (up to 100%) of their payments disclosed 
inappropriately, whilst in contrast 18 companies did not disclose any payments 
inappropriately (see Appendix 4 for details for each company). Companies reported a high 
volume of payments to organisations that did not adhere to EFPIA’s definition of a patient 
organisation (528, 10.1%). Some organisation names were also ambiguous and therefore 
could not be identified (57, 1.1%). Other inappropriate recipients were those not operating in 
the UK (54, 1.0%), and, occurring least frequently, more than one organisation reported for a 
single payment (17, 0.3%). Over 2012-2016 there were no clear changes over time, although 
the percentage of recipients that were not patient organisations was lowest in 2013, 2014 and 
2015 (9.3%, 9.6%, 8.0%, respectively) than in 2012 (17%) and 2016 (13.8%) (annual 
overview in Appendix 5).   
 
4.3. How informative were payment descriptions? 
 
  
The majority (3013, 66.0%) of disclosed payments were accompanied by a description of 
between 1-20 words (Table 2). Just 25 (0.6%) of payments had no description or details at all, 
with low percentages also being observed in the payments with the most words (51+). The 
most frequent length for a description was between 1-10 words with a median payment value 
of £5,050. The median value of payments did not increase beyond £5,050 until the number of 
words reached 61+ (examples of descriptions lengths in Appendix 6).  
 
[Table 2] 
 
As Table 2 demonstrates, longer descriptions of between 61-183 words were associated with 
higher median values (from £6,307.45 for 71-80 words to £14,140.00 for 91-100 words) and 
interquartile ranges (from 894.53 for 61-70 words to £17,753.11 for 81-90 words) than the 
shorter descriptions. Of the 110 payments that had longer descriptions, only 8 were 
describing more than one distinct payment goal, leaving us to tentatively conclude larger 
payments are associated with longer descriptions. Grouping description lengths into short (0-
20), medium (21-50) and long (51+), displayed no clear changes over time, for example the 
number of short descriptions was similar in 2012 and 2016 (66.7% and 64%, respectively) 
(see Appendices 7 and 8).  
 
The value of payments with unclear payment goals was £3,508,568.12 (6.1%) out of 
£57,305,252.78. Descriptions with unclear payment forms were a higher value of 
£4,817,512.52 (8.4%), whilst descriptions with an unclear form and goal were valued at 
£753,597.86 (1.3%). Table 3 reports the percentage (of the number of payments) of 
descriptions with an unclear payment form (7.4% of total) and goal (7.6% of total) out of 
4572. The proportion of descriptions with unclear payment forms and goals was lowest in 
2016 (52, 4.5% and 70, 6.1%, respectively), and highest in 2014 for payment goal (78, 9.0%) 
and in 2015 for payment form (95, 9.6%). Appendix 6 provides example descriptions within 
the various wordcount brackets, accompanied by our coding of the payment form and goal 
(both clear and unclear). A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that the number of words used to 
describe payments with clear payment forms was higher than unclear (U = 428416, p = .000). 
The same applied to clarity of payment goals (U = 155399, p = .000). Payment descriptions 
of >50 words had no unclear goals, whereas all but two wordcount brackets (61-70 and 71-
80) contained unclear payment forms. Fourteen companies did not make the goal of their 
payment clear in 20% or more of their payments, within which three companies had no 
descriptions with clear payment goals (Appendix 9). 
 
[Table 3] 
 
Descriptions were clear as to whether they were financial or a benefit in kind (35, 0.8% were 
unclear) but a higher number of payments were unclear as to whether the payment was for 
general core funding or if it was for a specific activity (470, 10.3%). Many descriptions did 
not clearly state whether payments were indirect or direct (3775, 82.6%) and were even more 
unclear regarding whether payments were restricted or unrestricted (4376, 95.7%). Similarly, 
the majority did not mention the VAT status of the payment (4543, 99.4%). Overall, there 
were no obvious changes over the five years (Table 4), although the number of payments that 
were unclear regarding restricted or unrestricted decreased consistently between 2012 
(99.1%) through to 2016 (91.2%). 
 
[Table 4] 
 
  
Continuing this trend, the percentage of the recipient's funding represented by each payment 
was only provided by 1 company (of 30, 3.3%) in 2012 (Pfizer), 1 (of 43, 2.3%) in 2013 
(Pfizer), 1 (of 47, 2.1%) in 2014 (Pfizer), 1 (of 54, 1.9%) in 2015 (Pfizer), and 3 (of 46, 
6.5%) in 2016 (Chugai, GSK, Pfizer). 
 
4.4. Overview: least and most transparent years 
 
Although there were very few noticeable changes over time, collating all of the indicators 
applying to inappropriate recipients (indicator 2) and clarity of payment descriptions 
(indicator 3), 2016 comes out as the most transparent year (top on 8 of 13 indicators) and 
2012 as the least transparent (bottom on 5 of the 13 indicators), as displayed in Appendix 10. 
5. Discussion 
 
Unlike transparency studies of patient organisations’ reporting of relations with the 
pharmaceutical industry (Colombo et al., 2012; Jones, 2008), ours is the first analysis 
evaluating the industry’s self-regulatory approach to transparency. We found that many 
companies lacked available disclosure reports, despite many of these being found to have 
made payments. Where disclosures were available, different recipient types were sometimes 
mixed together, with varying levels of information provided. These transparency 
shortcomings, coupled with the implications that pharmaceutical funding of patient 
organisations can have on health policy (Batt, 2017), raise questions about the sufficiency of 
the self-regulatory approach to payment disclosures. These concerns coincide with the 
shortcomings of industry self-regulation relating to the disclosure of payments to UK 
healthcare professionals (Mulinari and Ozieranski, 2018) and organisations (Ozieranski et al., 
2019b). 
 
5.1. Compromised transparency through withholding payments 
 
The EFPIA Code requires companies to annually update the list of supported organisations. 
Therefore, unless companies delete their reports or make no payments, at least one disclosure 
report should be available on every company website. Disclosure reports were available more 
frequently for companies that are ABPI members (65.2%) than not (34.8%), indicating 
membership of ABPI equates to greater transparency. Over half of the companies with no 
disclosure reports were mentioned in at least one charity annual account, suggesting failure to 
disclose, which is particularly worrying given that discrepancies with charity accounts 
occurred primarily towards the end of the period of observation (2015-2016) meaning they 
are unlikely to have been removed.  
 
The majority (73.5%) of companies with no disclosure that were mentioned in charity 
accounts were not ABPI members. This suggests that ABPI members are less likely to have 
undisclosed payments than non-members. Still, ABPI members are expected to abide by the 
standards set out by the ABPI Code (which we subsume under the higher-level EFPIA Code), 
therefore all ABPI members that have made payments should have a report available, unless 
they made no payments or payment reports have been removed. Disclosure UK requires 
companies to maintain disclosure information in the public for three years (ABPI, 2016), 
therefore one might assume a similar timeframe for patient organisations. It is positive that 
34.8% of non-members had a report available, as it reflects voluntary abidance of the relevant 
Codes. 
  
There is also a question mark over the remaining 19 companies with no disclosure reports 
available, and which were not mentioned in charity accounts, as we only looked at patient 
organisations in our sample which were registered with a charity regulator (444 of 508) and 
relied on patient organisations being transparent about their funders, although research has 
found that this is not always the case (Colombo et al., 2012).  
 
5.2. Inappropriate recipients: confused or careful? 
 
Inappropriate recipients artificially inflate the number of and value of payments. The high 
number of payments disclosed to recipients that we identified as not adhering to EFPIA’s 
definition of patient organisation (528) may reflect companies misinterpreting the definition 
of patient organisations, a well-known difficulty (Nicholas and Broadbent, 2015), which may 
lead some companies to over-disclose rather than potentially withhold payment information. 
It may also indicate the complexity of collaborative arrangements involving a patient 
organisation not receiving funding. Furthermore, three companies stated they disclosed 
payments to patient organisations in Disclosure UK, a separate disclosure system for 
healthcare organisations (Ozieranski et al., 2019b). This heavily complicates matters as 
Disclosure UK does not differentiate between payments to different organisation types 
(Ozieranski et al., 2019b), thus necessitating supplementary web searches to determine the 
level of support to patient organisations. Similarly, payments are not described beyond four 
generic payment categories, thus companies disclosing in Disclosure UK fall short of the 
EFPIA Code’s minimum transparency requirements. 
 
5.3. Form and goal of payments: murky descriptions or adequate information? 
 
Although unclear payment descriptions did not exceed 9.6% for either payment form (nature 
of the payment, such as sponsorship or a grant) or goal (reason for the payment, such as for 
policy engagement or education and training), their value was substantial at £4,817,512.52 
and £3,508,568.12, respectively. Therefore, the average reader will not know how a large 
chunk of payments were made or what purposes they were intended to support. We identified 
a link between the number of words used to describe payments and whether payments’ form 
and goal could be identified, thus validating our assumption that more words meant improved 
understandability. Conversely, shorter descriptions are making it unclear what large 
proportions of money are used to pay for, in apparent violation of the EFPIA Code. 
 
5.4. Blurry picture of transparency for clarity of descriptions  
 
Most descriptions were clear regarding whether payments were financial in nature or a 
benefit in kind. Yet the transparency picture was blurred when determining whether 
payments were provided for core or specific purposes, suggesting that companies were not 
always transparent as to whether their payments were intended for covering administrative 
costs, or specific purposes, such as sponsoring an event. Because industry funding represents 
a potential for a conflict of interest or a loss of independence (Ball et al., 2006), it is 
concerning that this information was not provided systematically. Further, despite an 
improvement between 2012-2016 (from 99.1% unclear to 91.2%) the majority of descriptions 
were unclear as to whether the payment was restricted or unrestricted. This makes it difficult 
to determine whether payments were made with specific requirements or conditions, or if the 
payments were flexible in terms of access and use.  
 
  
The picture became dramatically blurrier under the sub-indicator categories ‘indirect or 
direct’, ‘restricted or unrestricted’ and whether VAT is mentioned. Being able to identify 
whether payments were made directly or indirectly is an important distinction (ABPI, 2016) 
and helps the reader determine the ultimate financial beneficiary. This is important as making 
payments via a third party might allow for hiding money (Steinbrook and Ross., 2012). For 
example, if a company pays a PR firm to assist a patient organisation but the patient 
organisation is not reported as the ultimate recipient, there is a serious transparency 
shortcoming. It is also problematic that companies are not transparent about whether 
payments include VAT as this makes it difficult to determine whether the payment value 
disclosed is the payment amount received in full by the recipient (Ozieranski et al., 2019b; 
RAND, 2016). Overall, the very high (80% or more unclear) failure to report on three of the 
five clarity sub-indicators may be indicative of the EFPIA Code not stipulating clearly 
enough the need for additional information of this nature about payments.  
 
Important information is being neglected as very few companies provided their payment as a 
percentage of each recipient’s total income (the highest was 3 companies in 2016). The 
provision of this additional clarity would allow the reader to develop an understanding of the 
size of a payment in relation to the recipient size, as well as keep a track on patient 
organisations’ dependency on industry funding (Kent, 2007), which may lead to questions 
around undue influence (EFPIA, 2017).  
 
5.5. Scattered improvements over time 
 
Improvements over time were scarce across most of our transparency indicators. Although it 
is promising that disclosures covering 2016’s payments were the most transparent, marked 
improvements were only observed in the clarity of whether a payment was restricted or 
unrestricted (improved by 7.9%) and the proportion of payments with unclear payment 
forms, which more than halved.  
6. Possible policy solutions 
 
Our findings suggest that all companies should publish a disclosure report annually 
(regardless of whether they made any payments) using a standardised template which 
includes fields such as recipient, value of support, VAT status of value, goal of support, 
amongst other important variables highlighted in our paper. Until a recent update to the 
EFPIA Code (2019) it was unclear how long companies were expected to keep disclosure 
reports publicly available for. The Code (2019) now states that disclosure reports must be 
publicly available for at least 3 years, although this provision does not extend to the ABPI 
Code (2019), which still neglects this important point. This would allow policymakers, 
researchers and patients access to a precise overview of company payments in terms of their 
value and impact, in particular to determine the level of control a company has over the 
money. A specific definition of a patient organisation would address the current overlap 
between the nominally separate disclosure systems for healthcare organisations (Disclosure 
UK) and patient organisations (disclosures on individual company websites).  
 
Preferably, under the auspices of the ABPI, disclosure reports should form a central, annually 
updated database similar to Disclosure UK, while eliminating its well-recognised 
shortcomings (Mulinari and Ozieranski, 2018; Ozieranski et al, 2019b). Systematic oversight 
of regulations is also critical as companies providing funding to patient organisations focused 
  
on conditions for which they produce medicines (Lexchin, 2019; Mandeville et al., 2019). 
Therefore, the ABPI must monitor the compliance of disclosures with its Code, and by 
extension the EFPIA Code, to enable patients, carers, and policy-makers to make informed 
decisions about the information provided by patient organisations. Although increased 
transparency may not resolve potential conflicts of interests (Cain et al., 2005; Kmietowicz, 
2016), it is vital for good pharmaceutical governance (Kohler et al., 2016).  
7. Limitations 
 
The limitations of our research lie, firstly, in difficulties associated with the interpretation of 
the absence of many disclosure reports. Although we compared companies with no 
disclosures with charity annual accounts, we only based this on patient organisations that had 
been reported in another company’s disclosure. We also cannot be certain if companies 
previously had disclosure reports available but removed them. Crucially, charity accounts are 
not always transparent either. These limitations have likely resulted in us underestimating the 
value of undisclosed payments.  
 
Secondly, whilst we deduced what we could from the EFPIA Code, our transparency 
indicators are not exhaustive and may be open to interpretation.  
 
Thirdly, the quantitative nature of our research is as a limitation, particularly with regard to 
relying on the number of words used to describe payments as a transparency indicator, as 
well as reducing potentially rich data into quantitative codes.  
8. Conclusions 
 
In the UK, the pharmaceutical industry’s self-regulatory approach to transparency 
(considered multi-dimensionally, encompassing disclosure, accuracy, and clarity) of financial 
relations with patient organisations has not been working efficiently, and it is likely that 
many of these issues extend across Europe. With such complex relations as pharma-patient 
organisation ties, closer regulatory monitoring and standardisation in a centralised disclosure 
system is needed to enhance transparency and make these ties more accessible and 
comparable across companies and patient organisations.  
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